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PROJECTING CIVIL LITIGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF FILM 
THEORY 
MELISSA COLE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the movie Shadow of the Vampire,1 John Malkovich’s power-
hungry director goes into a frenzy of filmmaking ecstasy when the eccentric 
star of his film Nosferatu decides that he has waited long enough for the 
promised opportunity to drink his co-star’s blood and kills the actors and 
crewmembers who try to stop him.  When his cameraman moves to help the 
victims, Malkovich admonishes him to continue filming the gruesome 
sequence of events. “If it isn’t in the frame,” Malkovich rants, “it doesn’t 
exist.”2 
As soon as I heard those lines, it occurred to me that the film was about 
Civil Procedure. What is procedure, after all, but the method by which 
information makes it into the frame of the trial?  And what is the jury but the 
audience for the story?3 
Certainly, the parallels between a film audience and a trial jury have been 
recognized before.4  That observation, however, seems to be only the first step 
in a more searching analysis.  If juries put together the evidence to form a legal 
narrative in the same manner that movie audiences put together the bits of 
visual information presented to them to form a filmic narrative, then lawyers 
play the role of the filmmaker.  They choose what information is presented to 
their audience, how it is presented, and what conclusion the decision-maker is 
meant to draw from it. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My thanks to Arthur Knight 
for introducing me to film theory and for making space for my legal background in my study of 
it.  Special thanks to the staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for giving me the 
opportunity to combine my interests in film theory and civil procedure, and, of course, to my 
research assistant, Jennifer Heintz, who filled in the spaces between my frames. 
 1. SHADOW OF THE VAMPIRE (Universal Studios 2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 5 (1993) (“People, including judges 
and jurors, understand and restate events in terms of stories.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in 
a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (1994). 
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By extension, if lawyers are really filmmakers, then a course in Civil 
Procedure teaches them the mechanics of filmmaking.  No director can survive 
without some knowledge of camera operation, lighting, editing, and acting.  
Likewise, the only way a civil litigator can hope to present her story in court is 
through a solid understanding of the tools available to help her tell her story.  
And just as most moviegoers remain oblivious to all the painstaking tasks that 
go into making a film, so it is equally tempting to think that a trial is all there is 
to civil litigation.  However, a good film student knows how crucial the unseen 
elements—the lighting, the location, and the script re-writes—are to a 
successful film.  One would hope that law students, presumably interested in 
legal narratives, would find strategic considerations like choice of jurisdiction, 
pleading, and discovery equally important. 
Admittedly, few law students find a course in Civil Procedure as 
stimulating as a good film.  Applying film theory to the course concepts might 
help to alleviate this understandable lack of interest in the “how-to’s” of a 
practice most Civil Procedure students will not see for three years.  More 
importantly, film theory brings a critical perspective to our civil litigation 
system and exposes the issues of power and powerlessness we are more 
accustomed to confronting in substantive courses.5  Failing to appreciate the 
power dynamics of procedure consigns even the most conscientious student, 
practitioner, or professor to replicate and perpetuate them. 
In this essay, I survey the four basic units of a Civil Procedure course: 
jurisdiction, pleadings, discovery, and resolution.  For each, I introduce an 
applicable tenet of film theory and apply it to a case or rule covered in most 
Civil Procedure courses.  My goal is not merely to investigate how civil 
litigation frames real-life events and the consequences of that system, but also, 
hopefully, to convince others that these issues merit time in the classroom.  
While we may not have an obligation to entertain students in the way 
successful movies entertain their audiences, our job is certainly to educate 
them, not only on the mechanics of legal practices, but also on the power they 
employ as attorneys and on the responsibilities that accrue to such power. 
II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION, OR WHY THE AUDIENCE MATTERS 
In the film Fury,6 Spencer Tracy enjoys the unique experience of watching 
the trial of the mob accused of killing him.  A happy-go-lucky regular Joe (his 
name in the film) when the story begins, he becomes an embittered phantom 
after barely escaping a lynch mob in the small town where he had been jailed 
 
 5. Examining the specific substantive disputes between parties makes it easier to focus, for 
example, on which party had greater bargaining power because of her class, race, and/or sex, or 
how tort law favors parties with the financial means to account for their negligent actions in their 
yearly budgets. 
 6. FURY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1936). 
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because he fit the description of another stranger who had molested several 
children.  Listening to the trial intently on the radio, Joe is horrified to discover 
that the witnesses—members of the same small community as the accused—do 
their best to protect their friends and that the jury seems disinclined to convict.  
In the end, Joe, the outsider, must appear in court to tell the truth, in the 
process, of course, absolving the defendants of murder charges. 
Joe’s downfall lies in the fact that he is an outsider in a small town, where 
the townspeople are bound to stick together.  Although the audience can 
clearly see that Joe is the furthest thing from a child molester, the people of the 
jurisdiction in which he was arrested and lynched are not privy to the first half 
hour of the film, in which the audience learns what a good guy Joe is.  The 
jurisdiction is far from Joe’s home.  It is a small town, committed to its own, 
with a less-than-sophisticated criminal and court system.  In a big city, Joe 
would likely not have been jailed or lynched; in a different jurisdiction, the 
outcome of his attempted-killers’ trial might have come to a different 
conclusion. 
Jurisdiction, in other words, matters.  Lawyers know this; anyone who 
practices regularly in federal courts is likely to have written her fair share of 
jurisdictional motions.  First-year law students, however, quite understandably, 
have trouble appreciating its importance.  Without exposure to the variety of 
state laws, the differences in court systems, and the hard realities of long-
distance litigation, jurisdiction reduces for law students to a not-very-
interesting intellectual exercise in which the Supreme Court seems to take an 
inordinate and unjustified interest. 
Yet all of us can recall some film that we disliked because of our viewing 
experience—the bad date we saw it with, the movie theater whose air 
conditioner collapsed in the middle of the film, the epic that we rented and 
watched on video while paying the bills.  Similarly, movie studios spend 
countless dollars determining which demographic group is most likely to see 
the movie and marketing it directly to them.  Audiences determine whether a 
film breaks the bank or breaks the back of the distributor. 
So, too, the jurisdiction in which a case is heard is probably the single 
greatest determinant of which party will succeed. As Janet Staiger has 
observed, “without an audience, some would argue, no text or maker of [the] 
text exists.”7  By the same token, without a jurisdiction with authority to hear a 
case, the legal narrative—the means by which a dispute between two people 
acquires legal meaning and the power of redress—ceases to exist as well. 
 
 7. JANET STAIGER, INTERPRETING FILMS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORICAL RECEPTION OF 
AMERICAN CINEMA 3 (1992). 
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A. The Film Theory: Reception Studies 
Reception studies “defin[es] the reader as the source of meaning [in a 
film].”8  In other words, it posits that a particular film is not inscribed with a 
particular meaning, but rather that it acquires meaning through the audience 
members who interpret it. Reception studies’ objective lies “not [in] 
attempt[ing] to construct a generalized, systematic explanation of how 
individuals might have comprehended texts, and possibly someday will, but 
rather how they actually have understood them.”9  Film theorists recognize it 
as a political tool for examining how different groups of people, particularly 
traditionally ignored or subordinated people, construct meanings from a text 
that might be very different from the meaning the filmmakers hoped to 
inscribe.10 
Reception studies provides a useful framework for helping first-year law 
students understand the importance of jurisdiction because most of them can 
see how the perspective of different viewers influences how those individuals 
receive a film.11  In the same way that a film theorist might ask, “[w]hat is the 
spectator’s relation to the cinematic text?,”12 law students can ask about the 
relationship between the case itself and the audience that hears it—the jury, the 
judge, and the lawyers arguing the case.  Their personal circumstances and 
biases can plainly color their perception of justice in the same way the 
students’ own perceptions differ from each other. 
Perhaps, more importantly, reception studies also helps to highlight how 
the jurisdictional law that applies to a case can radically change the story that 
eventually makes its way into the courtroom.  Just as a film spectator “is 
constituted within a social formation,”13 so the “society” of a particular 
jurisdictional law influences how the case’s spectators will perceive it.  Staiger 
explains that the meaning viewers inscribe onto a film “may reside in whether 
or not spectators use referential codes to presume correspondence between the 
moving images and the real world.”14  In other words, how viewers make sense 
of the story—whether they find it believable—depends largely on their own 
frame of reference.  The law of the jurisdiction provides the frame of reference 
in which the lawyers and decision-makers make sense of the events giving rise 
to the lawsuit. 
 
 8. Marc Silberman, Robert C. Holub’s Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction, 33 NEW 
GERMAN CRITIQUE 249, 250 (1984) (book review). 
 9. STAIGER, supra note 7, at 8. 
 10. Id. at 96. 
 11. See id. (“[I]nterpreting a film requires perceiving from some perspective . . . .”). 
 12. Id. at 95. 
 13. Id. at 96. 
 14. STAIGER, supra note 7, at 96. 
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Robert Darnton illustrated this process in the filmic context in his review 
of Danton, a Polish movie about the French Revolution.15  Darnton explained 
that the film served an allegorical function for Polish audiences.  Because 
Polish audiences had a tradition of “liv[ing] with veiled meanings and 
ambiguous protests,” they saw the film not so much as about the French 
Revolution, but as an allegory about Stalin and his thought-control tactics.16  In 
this context, Robespierre was the personification of an evil that transcended his 
role in the film.  French audiences, on the other hand, saw Robespierre, while a 
despicable historical figure in reality, as the character in the film who set the 
Revolution in motion, and, therefore, as representing republican values of 
which the French were proud.17  If the filmic Robespierre were on trial for his 
acts, his attorneys would, no doubt, argue strenuously that jurisdiction should 
lie in France rather than Poland. 
Once jurisdiction becomes about how different audiences can change the 
meaning of the lawsuit, the doors are open to consider the attendant inherent 
social biases in the law.  Recognizing the range of possible interpretations of 
events arouses curiosity about the sorts of sociological factors that might 
influence such interpretations.18 Staiger explains that differences in the 
received meanings of films “are not idiosyncratic but due to social, political, 
and economic conditions, as well as to constituted identities such as gender, 
sexual preference, race, ethnicity, class, and nationality.”19  A discussion of 
why the parties preferred one jurisdiction over another would be incomplete 
without considerations of who the decision-makers are likely to be. 
So, too, anyone teaching Civil Procedure would do well to recognize that 
the students themselves are audience members—not just of the course, but of 
the case being discussed.  At a fundamental level, they should be encouraged 
to be an audience to the legal story that takes over from the events underlying 
the case.  As audience members, students also bring their own backgrounds 
and perceptions to the discussion.  To dismiss one student’s perception of what 
the case means as off the mark may say more about the professor who can not 
see beyond her own frame of reference than about the student’s understanding 
of effective procedural lawyering. 
 
 15. Robert Darnton, Danton and Double-Entendre, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 16, 1984, at 19. 
 16. Id. at 20. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See STAIGER, supra note 7, at 80-81 (describing her goals as “requir[ing], minimally, 
tracing as far as possible dominant and marginalized historical interpretive strategies as mediated 
by language and context”). 
 19. Id. at xi. 
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B. Civil Procedure: Considering the Audience 
In Civil Procedure, of course, practice is more important than theory.  
Applying reception theory to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson20 
illustrates how it can influence students’ own reception to personal jurisdiction 
and open discussion to the important role of procedure in seeking social 
justice. 
Any Civil Procedure professor is all too familiar with the facts of World-
Wide Volkswagen.  In 1977, Kay Eloise Robinson and her two children were 
seriously injured when the car she was driving was struck from behind and the 
gasoline tank ruptured, causing a fire in the passenger compartment.21  The 
Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma state court against the manufacturer of the 
car, the U.S. importer, the distributor, and the retail dealer.22  The distributor 
and the dealer, both located in New York, challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Oklahoma court, arguing that neither one “[did] any business in Oklahoma, 
ship[ped] or [sold] any products to or in that State, ha[d] an agent to receive 
process there, or purchase[d] advertisements in any media calculated to reach 
Oklahoma.”23 
The World-Wide Volkswagen majority opined that, while it might be 
foreseeable that a car purchased in New York would be involved in an accident 
in Oklahoma, “the foreseeability that is critical to due process is not the mere 
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.  Rather, it is 
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that 
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”24  Due to the lack 
of evidence “that any automobiles distributed by World-Wide [were] sold to 
retail customers outside [the] tristate area,” the majority found the Oklahoma 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants unconstitutional.25 
The first and most obvious application of reception theory would prompt 
considerations of why the Robinsons fought so vigorously to have their case 
heard in Oklahoma in the first place.  Beyond issues about the convenience of 
the parties, students surely would have views on how decision-makers might 
differ in New York and Oklahoma.  Such discussions in the first months of law 
school seem particularly important in a course designed to introduce concepts 
of federalism.26 
 
 20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 21. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353 (Okla. 1978), rev’d, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 22. Id. 
 23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 289. 
 24. Id. at 297. 
 25. Id. at 298. 
 26. This observation holds true even as the Internet jurisdiction cases shake the very 
foundations of that concept.  See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 907, 908-09 (D. Or. 1999). 
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Not only would an Oklahoma audience for the case probably differ from a 
New York audience,27 but the context in which the case must be interpreted is 
fundamental to the Supreme Court’s articulation of personal jurisdiction as a 
concern of constitutional due process.  Reading the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s decision28 introduces students to the difference between the 
prerequisite of ensuring that the state long-arm statute applies29 and the 
subsequent question whether this application violates the due process rights of 
the defendant.30  In essence, the U.S. Supreme Court is the audience for the 
Oklahoma court’s construction of the Oklahoma long-arm statute.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court constructs the rules by which federal courts interpret the 
application of such state statutes. 
With the help of reception studies, jurisdiction might lose some of its 
thankless status as the one thing everyone remembers hating in their first year 
of law school and no one remembers understanding.  Students may gain some 
perspective on jurisdiction by conceptualizing the cases they read as nothing 
more than stories told in an unfamiliar setting and the members of the legal 
community involved in the telling simply as the audience.  So, too, they gain 
the added benefit of tackling that most difficult of first-year difficulties—
believing that there is no “right” answer and that all of them have valuable 
interpretations to bring to the table, as long as they observe the necessary 
conditions for constructing legal meaning. 
III.  PLEADINGS AND NARRATIVE FRAMES 
In Rear Window,31 the literal limits of the frames that make up a film 
create some of the best of Alfred Hitchcock’s signature suspense films.  
Confined to a wheelchair with a broken leg, Jimmy Stewart’s photojournalist 
“Jeff” Jeffries amuses himself by watching the dramas that unfold in the 
windows of the apartments he sees from his own.  Viewing small pieces of his 
neighbors’ lives as they walk in and out of the frame of their windows, Jeffries 
constructs stories about each of them—Miss Lonelyhearts waiting for the date 
who never arrives; Miss Torso dancing erotically for unknown men; and, of 
course, the sudden disappearance of Mrs. Thorwald and Jeffries’ conclusion 
that she was murdered by her husband. 
When Jeffries suggests his murder theory to a detective, the detective 
protests, “That’s a secret, private world you’re looking into out there.  People 
 
 27. Disagreement with this principle would, of course, probably lead to fruitful and engaging 
classroom discussion. 
 28. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).  The casebook 
I use, BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2001), helpfully includes the opinion. 
 29. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 585 P.2d at 353. 
 30. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291. 
 31. REAR WINDOW (Paramount Studios 1954). 
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do a lot of things in private that they couldn’t possibly explain in public.”32  
The wisdom of this remark applies equally to the pleadings in a civil lawsuit.  
Certain facts, perhaps taken out of context, can create a very different story 
from the full picture.  No doubt the views from the front windows of the 
apartments Jeffries watches would yield different scenes and, thus, different 
stories about the apartments’ inhabitants.  It is all a matter of which window 
the spectator looks into, of how the story is framed for her. 
So, too, pleadings can be understood as the frames that must contain the 
messy, real-life events that give rise to a legal dispute; a means of choosing 
certain facts to construct a story.  The law contributes to this structure by 
making available certain causes of action requiring the satisfaction of certain 
elements.  The real strategy, then, lies with the parties as they struggle to gain 
the dominant voice in constructing the legal framework that will guide 
discovery and the story that they ultimately present to the decision-maker. 
A. The Film Theory: Feminist Film Theory 
In 1975, Laura Mulvey’s influential essay, Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema,33 radically altered—and, arguably, created—feminist film theory.  In 
the piece, Mulvey posits the woman in filmic narrative as the object of the 
cinematic gaze.  She explains how the female character is the medium upon 
which both the male protagonist and the viewer gaze, the conduit for the 
information the hero and the audience need to construct a coherent narrative.34  
As the object, rather than the subject, the woman has no volition of her own, 
and, instead, serves as the means of signifying what the story is about, rather 
than contributing to the story by her own actions.35 
This theory is particularly significant for film viewers, who are not aware 
that they are gazing at the woman and identifying with the man, thus 
replicating the conditions of power inscribed into the filmic narrative.  As 
Teresa de Lauretis explains, “the spectators are not aware of their own look, of 
themselves as looking on, as being voyeuristically complicit in the pleasures 
built into the image.”36  Not only do the viewers remain unaware of their own 
complicity in constructing the story, but “they are not aware of the look of the 
camera, so that they have the impression that the events, people, and places 
figured on the screen exist somewhere, in an objective—if fictional—world 
created by the filmmaker, the director, the artist.”37 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, 16 SCREEN 6 (1975). 
 34. Id. at 13. 
 35. Id. 
 36. TERESA DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF GENDER: ESSAYS OF THEORY, FILM, AND 
FICTION 98 (1987). 
 37. Id. 
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The parallel to a lawsuit’s audience is apparent.  The decision-makers, the 
lawyers, and probably even the parties themselves must view events as they are 
framed by the pleadings.  Common sense dictates that people’s actions are not 
designed to conform neatly to legal dictates.  If they were, there would be no 
need for the vats of ink that fill the pages of casebooks, treatises, and reporters, 
in which judges pontificate about whether a defendant owed a duty of care to 
the plaintiff or whether the parties actually agreed to the bargain.  Yet, in the 
framework of the complaint, actions must satisfy the elements of the claim.  
Any actions beyond the chosen frame of the legal elements become irrelevant.  
The pleadings are, in effect, the shooting script for the movie, the preparation 
for what will appear onscreen before the decision-maker/audience. 
What makes the pleadings so effective is the fact that the audience tends 
not to notice how the legal framework reshapes events in its image.  As de 
Lauretis explains, “the cinema screen acts like a dream screen for the 
spectator-subject, a screen at once bearing and hiding, displaying and 
displacing, unconscious images and ‘thoughts.’”38  In other words, as much 
unconscious thought goes into the decision-makers’ construction of the story 
as conscious thought.  Without seeing the constraints placed on the story—the 
blank spaces that fail to fit the pieces of the legal puzzle—the decision-makers 
arrive at an uncritical conclusion about what actually happened when, in fact, 
the story is likely far more complicated.  What really happened disappears 
outside the frame, but they never miss it because they are not aware that a 
frame exists. 
What the legal decision-makers arrive at is, like the story constructed by a 
filmgoer, “an integral realism, a recreation of the world in [their] own image, 
an image unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the artist or the 
irreversibility of time.”39  The import of this conclusion gains resonance when 
viewed in light of a preceding examination of jurisdiction.  As discussed,40 
different decision-makers bring very different backgrounds and expectations to 
their construction of what happened between the parties.  In other words, 
ignorant of their position as spectators presented events within a limiting 
framework, they construct a version of reality that is imbued with their own 
sense of reality and that reinscribes the relationship of powerful subject to 
powerless object. 
 
 38. Id. at 97. 
 39. ANDRÉ BAZIN, The Myth of Total Cinema, in WHAT IS CINEMA? 21 (Hugh Gray trans., 
1967). 
 40. See supra Part II. 
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B. Civil Procedure: Framing the Gaze 
Feminist film theory illustrates how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Conley v. Gibson41 does far more than simply provide the controlling 
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that the complaint contain “a short 
and plain statement of the claim . . . .”42  The decision also exposes the practice 
and pitfalls of framing the narrative in the pleadings and the play of powers 
that determine meaning in a lawsuit. 
In Conley, the plaintiffs, African-American employees of the Texas and 
New Orleans Railroad, brought suit on behalf of themselves and other 
similarly situated black employees after the Railroad discharged or demoted 
them in 1954 claiming that it was abolishing their positions, when in fact it 
filled the positions with white employees.43  The plaintiffs had no cause of 
action against their employer,44 so they sued the union to which they belonged 
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).45 Because the collective 
bargaining agreement between the Union and the Railroad provided covered 
employees with protection from discharge and demotion, the plaintiffs argued 
that the Union violated the RLA because it “did nothing to protect them against 
these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection 
comparable to that given white employees.”46 
The Union moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.47  According to the Union, the RLA imposed on 
it only a duty to represent union members fairly in the negotiation of the 
collective bargaining agreement, which it did, as evidenced by the provisions 
on discharge and demotion.48 The Union argued that it could not be held 
responsible for the subsequent discriminatory conduct of the Railroad alleged 
in the plaintiffs’ complaint.49 
Two important points flow from an examination of the complaint within 
the tenets of feminist film theory.  First of all, the dominant conventions of the 
storytelling medium—be it narrative cinema or the legal system—dictate how 
a story must be told in order for its audience to find it coherent.  A legal story 
must be framed within the dictates of some substantive law.  A lengthy and 
confusing piece of writing, the complaint did not set forth a coherent legal 
 
 41. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42 (1957). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 43. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
 44. Title VII, which provides a private cause of action for race discrimination by businesses 
with at least 15 employees, was not enacted until 1964.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 45. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  The Union also moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and for the failure to join 
an indispensable party as a defendant.  Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 47. 
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story.  Therefore, although it presented the events as the plaintiffs understood 
them, it did not make sense to the trial judge, who expected a legal narrative. 
The second point follows on this observation, although it is often ignored: 
the dominant discourse is not the only one.  Discussing why the plaintiffs 
framed the complaint as they did gives rise to a consideration of how the 
narrative conventions of pleading exert tremendous power over the parties’ 
ability to receive legal recompense for their injuries.  In Conley, the plaintiffs, 
as African-American men working in Texas in the 1950s, were obviously 
disempowered.  They had an important story to tell, yet they could not tell it in 
court.  It, therefore, becomes relatively easy for law students to see the patterns 
of power and inequity embedded in the seemingly simple process of civil 
pleading. 
Discussing the legal constraints the Conley plaintiffs faced lends yet 
another layer of complexity to the framing process.  Quite apparently, the 
employer, the Railroad, engaged in blatant racial discrimination.  Yet, at the 
time they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs had no federal cause of action 
against their employer.50  In order to avoid a hostile Texas state court, they 
strained to fit events into the framework of the Railway Labor Act.51  Under 
the RLA, however, the plaintiffs had to seek redress from their union 
representatives, not their employer who had harmed them.52 
The law thus framed the complaint in a way that radically changed the 
plaintiff’s story.  They were forced to cast the Union as the sole perpetrator of 
discrimination. The Railroad’s discriminatory acts, placed outside the narrative 
framework by the applicable law, was so diminished as to make both the 
district court judge and the appellate panel determine that they lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.53 
The plaintiffs were, thus, quite apparently powerless within the dominant 
legal discourse that determined how they could frame their story.  They were 
positioned much as feminist film theory posits women are positioned within a 
filmic narrative, as objects that are acted upon rather than subjects that can act 
of their own accord.  They faced the problem of “speak[ing] as subjects of 
discourses which negate or objectify [them] through their representations.”54 
One might argue that all of this theory is negated by the fact that the 
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and found that, as 
 
 50. See supra note 44. 
 51. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
 52. Id. at 46. 
 53. Id. at 43-44.  The lower courts concluded that the National Railroad Adjustment Board 
(NRAB) had exclusive jurisdiction because the dispute was over the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement.  The Court reversed, stating that the Railway Labor Act conferred 
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much as the complaint deviated from legal narrative conventions, it did, in fact, 
state a claim sufficient to withstand the defendants’ motion to dismiss.55  
Indeed, raising the question of why the Court worked so hard to find a valid 
claim inevitably leads to fruitful classroom discussion about the circumstances 
justifying the Court’s decision in Conley and its ramifications as a rule of law 
for subsequent cases.  Students can surely see that the Court’s interpretation of 
Rule 8(a)(2) was not objectively divorced from the circumstances of the case 
before it, which few people would dispute militated in favor of allowing the 
claim to proceed in federal court. 
The protective stance of the Court, however, leads back to the issues of 
power and powerlessness exemplified by the lower courts.  The Supreme 
Court, from its position of authority, essentially rewrote the complaint in the 
terms of the legal discourse it dominated. The Court constructed a story 
different from the one the plaintiffs told. Certainly, such a retelling was 
necessary if the plaintiffs were to have any hope of legal redress.  But just as a 
female moviegoer must gaze at and therefore objectify the female character in 
the film,56 so the Conley plaintiffs had no choice but to participate in their own 
powerlessness within the legal system. 
Feminist film theory thus can do for Civil Procedure what it has done for 
narrative cinema.  It can wake us up to the fact that we are observing a 
constructed narrative, not a depiction of real life.  It can remind us of our own 
role in constructing the story we see.  And, most importantly, once we have 
been exposed to it, it refuses to let us ignore the power of the subject and the 
powerlessness of the object within the telling of any legal story.  As 
responsible lawyers, we must, at least, admit to this dynamic.  As responsible 
law professors, we should, at least, give the students the same option. 
IV.  DISCOVERY AND THE “SOCIAL IMAGINARY” 
The infamous Rodney King video exposed people who had never seen a 
police baton removed from an officer’s belt to the reality of physical force.  It 
reopened and reworked discussions about racism in the United States.  It 
sparked riots across the city of Los Angeles, with grave damage to property, 
individuals, and communities.  But it did not, at their first trial, convict the 
police officers who were captured beating Rodney King on videotape. 
The shock at the first verdict finding the police officers innocent57—even 
when the video footage had been replayed so many times on television—
reverberated into riots.  It found less violent expression in the belief that the 
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jury was racist.58  What other explanation could there be for a failure to convict 
in the face of such indisputable videotaped evidence of excessive force? 
Considering the videotape and the trial outcome in the context of civil 
discovery might provide some answers to this question.  For the purposes of 
understanding Civil Procedure as the construction of a legal narrative, film 
theory explains the ways in which viewers may interpret the information the 
filmmakers present and, therefore, how the parties to a lawsuit seek to use the 
information they receive in discovery to construct a narrative that fits their 
framing of the story.  Discovery thus becomes a crucial part of the filmmaking 
process of civil litigation, for the legal stories can be told only through the 
documentary footage at the parties’ disposal. 
A. The Film Theory: The “Blurred Boundaries”59 of Documentary Film 
Documentary film theory seems a particularly useful framework for 
considering civil discovery because, as Bill Nichols observes, documentary 
films “appear as pale reflections of the dominant, instrumental discourses in 
our society.”60  While they purport to record “reality”—just as discovery is 
designed to find out what “really” happened61—documentary films, “[l]ike 
fiction, . . . can . . . suggest that [their] perceptions and values belong to [their] 
characters, or adhere to the historical world itself: the film merely reveals what 
we could have seen around us had we, too, looked with a patient, discerning 
eye.”62 In suggesting to the viewer that what she is seeing is “true” and 
unbiased, documentary film has the power to engage in “the discursive 
formations, the language games, and rhetorical stratagems by and through 
which pleasure and power, ideologies and utopias, subjects and subjectivities 
receive tangible representation.”63  This power brings with it the decline of 
“[t]he goal of documenting reality . . . .”64 
The ability of the defense to obtain an acquittal in spite of the Rodney 
King video illustrates this process of documentary distortion, received by its 
audience as documented reality.  In his essay The Trials and Tribulations of 
Rodney King, Nichols calls the prosecution’s belief that the videotape was the 
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“proverbial smoking gun” a “positivist fallacy.”65 While the prosecution 
viewed the tape as a document of one particular reality, the defense reworked 
the “reality” it documented, turning it into “[c]onfirmation . . . . [o]f the rough 
and brutal nature of police work. . . . the risk and uncertainty that confront 
officers in the street. . . . [and] the dire necessity of controlled force to 
safeguard the men in blue and preserve the lives of suspects who might 
otherwise be killed.”66 
The defense in effect changed the meaning of the videotape—and, in the 
process, showed that no piece of evidence is imbued with absolute meaning—
by constructing a story outside the frame of the video, a story of “[i]mportant, 
mitigating events [that] occurred before the tape began.”67  In this story, King’s 
own behavior justified the officers’ brutal actions.  According to the defense, 
the officers had reason to believe he was a dangerous felon, so that the frame 
of the video “treats all King’s subsequent behavior as confirmation: King was 
a serious threat who ‘knew all the tricks to take out a police officer.’”68  Hence, 
“[j]ustification and motivation for what follows resides in this prior set of 
events for which no video record exists.”69 
What made the defense’s use of the documentary video so brilliant, 
Nichols concludes, was that their reinterpretation depended on “the degree to 
which [their] claims correspond[ed] to the social imaginary within which the 
listener, or jury, already lives.”70  In other words, the defense simply tapped 
into the jury’s “social imaginary”—“those social relations members of [the 
jury] imagine they have to their actual relation to another group”71—and 
recognized how the jury would be inclined to read the videotape as 
confirmation of their own preexisting prejudices and fears. 
The lessons for civil discovery are apparent.  First of all, there is no 
absolute and unified story to be found in discovery.  Treating each piece of 
information as indicative of the truth of one’s story disadvantages the attorney 
through her own ignorance.  Rarely does the information obtained through 
discovery appear to be the “smoking gun” that the King video seemed to the 
prosecution; yet even this supposedly indisputable evidence of police brutality 
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and racism was capable of more than one interpretation.  Far from uncovering 
the truth about the events giving rise to the lawsuit,72 discovery, at best, 
provides the parties with scenes to play before the jury in a certain sequence 
that constructs the story they want to tell.73 
In the discovery phase, civil attorneys finally emerge clearly as 
filmmakers. While the role may have been subtle as they chose their 
jurisdictional audience and framed the dispute in the pleadings, the filmmaking 
aspects of these roles become apparent as, like documentary filmmakers, they 
gather the facts that they will construct into their own version of “reality.” 
B. Civil Procedure: Gathering the Footage 
The dangers and possibilities of civil discovery as documentary 
filmmaking can be illustrated by considering the recent change in Rule 
26(b)(1).74  In 2000, the Rule was revised in an attempt to cabin the extremely 
broad scope of discovery.  Under the prior version of the Rule, parties were 
free to discover any information “relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
action,” while the 2000 amendment restricts discovery to information that is 
“relevant to claims and defenses of any party.”75 
Under the old “relevant to the subject matter” Rule, what was “relevant” 
was framed entirely by the “social imaginary” of the viewers—the parties and 
their representatives engaged in the discovery process.  Because the scope of 
discovery under the old Rule was extremely expansive,76 the parties were free 
to inscribe their own story onto events by searching broadly for any events that 
confirmed their conceptualization of the dispute. As Nichols explains, 
“meaning is what we, audience or jury, attach to a signifier, to render it 
intelligible.”77  In other words, events have no inherent meaning other than 
what individuals assign to them. 
Viewed in the context of documentary film theory, the new “relevant to the 
claim or defense of any party” Rule is a distinction without a difference.  The 
language of the revised Rule specifically links discoverable information to the 
parties’ framing of the story, their claims or defenses.  Yet, as discussed 
previously, parties develop their claims or defenses in order to frame a story 
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that corresponds to their version of events, not to tell the whole “truth” about 
what happened.78  Just as the defense in the Rodney King case used the video 
to confirm their version of events, so the parties in civil discovery are directed 
to seek information that verifies their own “social imaginary,” or at least what 
they hope will be the “social imaginary” of the decision-maker.79  “Relevance” 
under the new version of the Rule is thus even more closely aligned with the 
power of the parties’ narratives. 
Another layer of strategy also goes into the construction of documentary 
film, one that further belies the truth-seeking function of liberal discovery.80  
Just as the documentary filmmaker must construct a narrative out of whatever 
footage she is able to capture, so the civil attorney’s narrative is limited by the 
information she is able to obtain in discovery.  Any information that is not 
discovered ceases to exist for the purposes of the legal narrative.  Information, 
in turn, will not be discovered unless the lawyers specifically ask for it.81 
What the lawyers seek to discover, however, depends on what they believe 
is relevant—how they create the story.  Because lawyers create the story for a 
particular audience, their goal is not to tell an empirically true story, but the 
version of it that will convince the decision-maker to rule in their favor.  
Limiting discovery to information relevant to the stories constructed by each 
party thus clarifies that discovery is not about uncovering the true version of 
events, but about constructing the narratives of the parties, imbued as they are 
with expectations about the “social imaginary” of the decision-maker.82 
Using documentary film theory to deconstruct the tenets of liberal 
discovery certainly provides fodder for classroom discussion.  Some people 
would surely see nothing wrong with the proposition that the parties construct 
their own stories in a way designed to ensure that the decision-maker believes 
they are true; such, one might argue, is the nature of an adversarial system.  
Others might decry the entire deconstructionist project as nothing but 
skepticism, a theory that distorts the empirical nature of certain facts and the 
ability of the decision-maker to arrive at a correct version of reality.  Both 
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positions bring up ethical issues about how much to disclose and how to 
disclose it, as well as the limits of legal strategizing.  And, as with all film 
theory, such discussion exposes students to the great power of legal storytellers 
and of their responsibility to resist the temptations of using the stereotypes and 
inherent biases of the “social imaginary” to fill in the gaps in their own cases. 
V.  TRIALS, VERDICTS, AND POSTMODERN THEORY 
The documentary film The Thin Blue Line is probably best known for 
leading to the release of Randall Dale Adams from death row.83  The film’s 
success showed how it had the power to reinforce its own message—that the 
legal process, like a documentary film, is not designed to uncover empirical 
truths and that a miscarriage of justice is not simply the result of insufficient 
information. 
The filmmaker Errol Morris, however, set out in The Thin Blue Line to 
dispute the notion of his own documentary’s power.  Rather than the more 
typical mode of documentary filmmaking as presentation of a reality 
objectively constructed through interviews and investigation, The Thin Blue 
Line expressly subverts the notion of its own objectivity.  It contains moments 
of obviously suspended reality—clips from old gangster movies, exaggerated 
reenactments signaling that they are merely the director’s version of reality, 
and the repeated vision of a cup of coffee falling to the floor in slow motion, 
literally suspended by the film medium.84 
Most importantly, in The Thin Blue Line, Morris consciously and expressly 
tells the audience that the film presents only one version of events and invites 
them to witness their own attempts to construct a coherent narrative.  The 
film’s power lies in its message that we create our own truths, whether as a 
movie audience or as a jury.  Just as the jury became convinced that Adams 
murdered a police officer, so the movie audience concludes that they convicted 
the wrong man. 
The Thin Blue Line thus illustrates the equally thin line between 
filmmaking and civil litigation.  It exposes the lie of documenting reality in a 
way that applies to trials as well as documentary films.  Understanding the film 
as a postmodern meditation on legal storytelling offers insight into the verdicts 
obtained through civil litigation. 
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A. The Film Theory: Affirmative Postmodernism 
Richard Sherwin uses The Thin Blue Line to show how “[i]n the context of 
the law and legal judgments, the internalized frameworks that we draw upon to 
organize and interpret events, experiences, and actions are necessary to the 
most basic acts of separating out the believable from that which is false, 
incredible, or simply unacceptable.”85  He explains that, like a trial, the movie 
presents a linear, narrative story, in which “the audience as detective/juror 
traces the clues that point to a sinister plot by state officials to frame Randall 
Dale Adams.”86  In the narrative mode, “[t]he clues fit neatly into a story that 
ends when the mystery of the frameup is revealed and solved.”87  The linear 
story succeeds because “[w]e want to believe Adams is innocent; he fits our 
image of a likely victim of official abuse.  Similarly, it is easy for us to distrust 
the people who participate in the frameup; they fit the script for the corrupt and 
deceitful.”88 
At the same time, Sherwin explains, the film engages in a “less familiar, 
nonlinear (arguably postmodern) form of storytelling.”89  In this story, “we 
find ourselves in a universe of fate and fortune, circularity and irresolution.  
The nonlinear story about the murder of Officer Wood suggests that our 
conventional knowledge about causation and meaning may not be sufficient.”90 
The coexistence of this obviously nonlinear plot—with its message that we can 
never know what is true—and the linear narrative “draws our attention not 
only to how we recognize truth and justice, but also to those underlying shared 
beliefs that allow us to agree upon a particular interpretation or meaning of an 
event.”91  The Thin Blue Line gains its power, as Sherwin describes, by 
“implicat[ing] all of us in our complacency about how easily we employ ready-
made notions of truth and justice to save ourselves from the anxiety and doubts 
that might otherwise plague our judgments.”92 
Sherwin spells out the message for the legal narrative of the trial by 
reminding us that  “the only reality that counts for a trial lawyer is the one in 
the jury’s mind.”93  In a trial, lawyers provide jurors with “familiar mental 
constructs” to help them create the linear narrative they crave, one “that best 
reflect[s] a preferred sense of truth and justice.”94  In other words, although the 
nonlinear, unknowable reality is truer to life, the trial is designed to create a 
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linear narrative that provides closure and absolutism.  The only place for the 
nonlinear lies in discrediting evidence that disturbs the clarity of the 
constructed narrative.95 
The lesson for a course in Civil Procedure is obvious.  The prior 
examinations of the importance of jurisdiction to select an audience, of 
framing the legal narrative through the pleadings, and of drawing on the 
“social imaginary” in the discovery process deposit one comfortably in the 
realm of postmodern theory occupied by The Thin Blue Line.  The civil verdict 
is exposed as a neat narrative conclusion to a story that can not hope to convey 
the reality of the events that gave rise to the lawsuit.  Rather, it serves to 
placate our desire for a clear “sense of truth and justice.”96 
B. Civil Procedure: Deconstructing the Jury’s Narrative 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad97 
serves as a classic example of how both the jury and the reviewing courts must 
manipulate the trial evidence in order to arrive at a sufficiently linear legal 
conclusion to satisfy the fiction that civil litigation leads to truth.  The plaintiff 
in Gallick was a crew foreman working on the railroad’s right of way.98  On 
that stretch of road lay “a pool of stagnant water, in and about which were dead 
and decayed rats and pigeons, or portions thereof.”99  While working near the 
pool, Gallick was bitten by an insect; the bite subsequently became infected, 
the infection spread throughout his body, and eventually both of his legs were 
amputated.100  After a trial in state court, the jury returned a special verdict, 
and the trial court awarded damages to Gallick.101 
The first lesson postmodern film theory offers in considering the Gallick 
case is the foolhardiness of special jury verdicts, or, for that matter, general 
verdicts with interrogatories.102  To the lawyers and judges involved, the jury’s 
particular findings must comport with a general legal conclusion: if the 
elements of the claim are proven by the plaintiff, he wins; if they are not, he 
loses.  However, this expectation ignores the “social imaginary” of the jury, in 
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which they unconsciously bring their own expectations and beliefs into the 
story, constructing it as they see reality, not necessarily as the law demands.103 
The majority opinion of the Court appears to affirm the jury’s power to fill 
in the gaps between frames, to deduct what they believe happened out of the 
range of the camera, or the evidence presented.  The Railroad argued that the 
jury’s special verdict failed to establish either causation or foreseeability.104  
As to causation, the Court found it sufficient that Gallick had testified that he 
was bitten a second or two after walking away from the pool and that he had 
previously seen similar insects in the pool.105  In addition, “two medical 
witnesses testified that stagnant, rat-infested pools breed and attract insects.”106  
Finally, in their special verdict, the jury found that the pool “attracted bugs and 
vermin.”107 
Although the jury never specifically found that the pool attracted this 
particular insect or that the insect that bit Gallick came from the pool, the 
Court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of causation.108  
Implicit in this conclusion is the recognition that the decision-maker must fill 
in some gaps in the evidence to achieve the linear narrative that guarantees a 
clear legal conclusion.  Similarly, a movie audience might see only a shot of a 
couple climbing out of a cab in front of a restaurant, immediately followed by 
a shot of them sitting at a table inside the restaurant, but they will 
unconsciously intuit that the couple walked across the sidewalk and into the 
restaurant, where they were shown to the table.  Indeed, they probably do not 
even notice the missing “evidence.” 
As to the Railroad’s argument that the special verdict did not support the 
conclusion that Gallick’s injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
the Railroad’s negligence, the Court found it “clear that the jury concluded that 
[the Railroad] should have realized the increased likelihood of an insect’s 
biting [Gallick] while he was working in the vicinity of the pool.”109  Although 
the jury reached two conclusions that seemed inconsistent with a finding that 
the Railroad was liable—that the Railroad “could not foresee that the stagnant 
pool would set into being a chain of events that would culminate in petitioner’s 
present physical condition” and that the Railroad “did not have reason to 
anticipate that its maintenance of the pool ‘would or might probably result in a 
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mishap or an injury’”110—the Court iterated “the duty of the courts to attempt 
to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them.”111 
Again, the Court made clear the necessity of reconstructing the jury’s 
construction of the story in a way that would satisfy the particular linear 
dictates of the law.  Under Sherwin’s theory of The Thin Blue Line, the film’s 
nonlinear techniques succeed where they support the linear, narrative storyline 
that the audience craves.112  The audience, constructing a story that makes 
sense to them, can account for things that make no sense by according them the 
role of that which they choose not to believe, much like a discredited witness.  
While the jury acts like an audience, the reviewing courts must adhere strictly 
to a storyline that is not just linear, but that is linear in a peculiarly legal way.  
Just as the underlying events had to be framed within the constraints of the law 
in the pleadings,113 so too the verdict must not stray from the logic of adding 
up the elements to equal the wrong.  The Gallick majority therefore 
“harmonized” the jury’s otherwise understandable conclusions so that the 
general linear narrative the jury constructed became a specifically legal one. 
The Gallick dissent recognized that the majority was, in fact, filling in the 
gaps to support an unequivocal legal conclusion to Gallick’s story.  “By 
undertaking to reconcile irretrievably conflicting findings of the jury,” the 
dissent complained, “the Court, we think, has . . . invaded the province of the 
jury.”114  The jury’s findings, according to the dissent, simply could not be 
combined into a coherent legal narrative free of ambiguity.  On the other hand, 
the dissent subscribed to the belief that an unambiguous conclusion could be 
reached by a different jury.115 
Considering the jury verdict through the lens of postmodern film theory 
suggests that the more the law strives for unambiguous legal conclusions, the 
more it must “harmonize” the inconsistencies that exist in any representation of 
events.  Just as a film audience tends not to tolerate plot inconsistencies, so the 
legal system abhors evidentiary ones, even when they reflect life’s 
ambiguities.116 
CONCLUSION 
The audience never discovers whether justice is served at the end of 
Shadow of the Vampire. They receive no information about a legal 
investigation or trial.  The film is not about social justice, but about the thin 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 75. 
 113. See supra Part III. 
 114. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. (suggesting vacating the judgment and remanding for a new trial). 
 116. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 71. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
42 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:21 
lens of the camera that purports to separate reality from fiction and about the 
ultimate invisibility of that glass borderline.  The linear narrative of the film 
concludes with the grisly actions of Willem Dafoe’s “vampire”; it is complete 
and coherent without the aftermath of investigation and prosecution. 
Civil Procedure picks up where the events of the film leave off.  Just as the 
filmmaker constructs a narrative “reality” that invites the audience to feel as if 
they are living through the events in real time, our system of civil litigation sets 
up a medium to view the events ex post facto, literally sitting in judgment.  If 
anything, applying film theory to Civil Procedure shows that the possibilities 
for manipulating the audience’s perception of the story are even greater in civil 
litigation than in filmmaking. 
Given both the dangers of manipulation, misperception, and domination 
and the inherent expectation that lawyers exploit the audience in the name of 
zealous advocacy, the lessons of film theory have a particular urgency.  As 
with any innocent entertainment, film theory can be used merely to make Civil 
Procedure interesting.  But all innocent entertainments have a dark side, an 
invocation of the unexamined biases we all carry with us and of our role in the 
replication of systems of power and powerlessness.  By employing film theory 
to illuminate the dark side of our civil litigation system, Civil Procedure 
professors can truly empower their students to work within a system that they 
understand deeply, rather than being thoughtlessly directed by rules they fail to 
question. 
 
